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Greg Young
HONORING GREG YOUNG
RICHARD BOLDT ∗ AND JANA SINGER ∗∗
In an appreciation for Charles Black published simultaneously in the
Columbia Law Review and the Yale Law Journal, Guido Calabresi referred
to his colleague as a “gentle genius.”1 The word genius gets bandied about
too much these days, but I think it is fair to say that there was a sort of
genius that surrounded Charlie Black and his work, and I think it is also fair
to say that there is a special kind of genius in the way that Greg Young has
served as a teacher, scholar, mentor and friend to those of us who have
known him over the years here at the University of Maryland.
Our mutual friend Marc Feldman used to say that Greg thinks his way
more deeply into a set of ideas that has drawn his attention than anyone else
he knew. That seems right to me. Beyond its depth or intensity, I think the
most notable thing about Greg’s approach to legal analysis is that it has a
kind of three-dimensionality. Where the rest of us draw on a flat surface (or
perhaps paint with color, if we’re lucky), Greg sculpts—in the classroom, in
print, even in casual conversation in his office or at a workshop.
Remarkable.
For those who have not read Greg’s work (or have not read it in a
while), I note two examples (among many) that demonstrate this special set
of qualities. One piece is recent, Greg’s masterful article on motive in
constitutional law, 2 the other older, his exhaustive study of “Public Rights
and the Federal Judicial Power,” published in the 1980s in the Buffalo Law
Review. 3
The motive piece picks up where Elena Kagan’s and Donald Regan’s
work leaves off. Kagan, for example, wrote an important article about the
∗
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ways in which a concern for illegitimate motive shapes First Amendment
law. In her view, First Amendment doctrine functions as a proxy for
“hunting” improper government purposes. Greg largely agrees with Dean
Kagan, but he goes far beyond her thesis to explore the question of why we
should be concerned about improper motives animating decisionmaking by
the political branches. He considers and then largely rejects the possibility
that improper government motive works a deonotological harm, concluding
instead that we care (and should care) about illegitimate motives because of
both the concrete and the expressive consequentialist harms that they
produce. The article weaves in (or perhaps cuts in) deeply insightful
discussions of what it means to assign a motive to an individual agent or a
corporate actor like a legislature; how a concern with motive interacts with
the various levels of judicial scrutiny that the Court has developed in the
areas of substantive due process, equal protection, the First Amendment,
and even the dormant commerce clause; and how we ought to think about
government policies that are driven by improper, perhaps hateful, motives,
but that could be supported by other entirely adequate public purposes. If
all that were not enough for one law review article, Greg then applies this
careful, nuanced, three-dimensional assessment of motive in constitutional
analysis to some of the most difficult decisions the Court has given us in
recent years, the Cleburne case, 4 Romer v. Evans, 5 and Lawrence v. Texas. 6
This is deeply insightful work. Astonishing, actually.
So too is his Buffalo Law Review piece on the Court’s accommodation
of Article III’s requirement that the federal judicial power be insulated from
the political branches with the need to create administrative adjudicatory
mechanisms in our modern regulatory state. Where his motive article
showcases Greg the wise philosopher, his Buffalo piece brings onto the
stage Greg the careful historian. He takes his readers from the mid-19th
century origins of the public rights doctrine, in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken
Land Co., 7 to the early 1930s mess that was Crowell v. Benson, 8 to the
then-current state of the law in the Northern Pipeline9 case that struck down
as unconstitutional non-Article III bankruptcy tribunals. Throughout, Greg
helps his reader understand that an evolving (and enlarging) conception of
the public interest, even in cases nominally involving only claims by one
private party against another, has driven the development of the law in this
area. In the end, Greg concludes that the problem is not amenable to easy
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(or clear cut) answers, and that a flexible multifactored approach is
required. Greg comes through the text as a calm, expert observer helping us
to see that we can make our way through this thicket, if we can just manage
to avoid panicking, if we realize that life is sometimes complex and messy
and that good legal solutions also sometimes are complex and messy.
Greg shows a similar appreciation for history and complexity in his
2002 article on “The Significance of Border Crossings” as an element of
Congress’ commerce clause jurisprudence. 10 The article examines the
Court’s then-recent decisions in the Lopez 11 and Morrison 12 cases, which
were widely viewed as signaling a narrowing of Congress’ Commerce
Clause authority. What is striking about Greg’s article is that it focuses on
an aspect of the two decisions that most other commentators had ignored:
whether Congress had the ability to regulate events that took place entirely
within states solely on the ground of interstate border crossings that had
preceded those events. In answering that question, Greg engages in an
analytic tour de force that engages not only two centuries of commerce
clause decisions but also other areas of constitutional law, including the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions—a doctrine that most commentators
had considered relevant only in the context of individual rights. I use the
article whenever I teach Constitutional Law—not only to help my students
understand the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but also to
emphasize the connection between seemingly discrete areas of
constitutional doctrine—even areas that might be covered in two separate
courses. I also share with my students Greg’s colorful analogies—from his
bemused description of “federal law following materials transported across
state lines like bubble gum stuck to a shoe” to his characterization of
originalism as “an attempt to hold a séance with the Framers.” Not a
particularly promising undertaking, but I am confident that Greg could hold
his own at any such event—either awake or asleep.
So what about the “gentle” part? Well perhaps the best way to capture
that dimension is to say that Greg always roots for others—his students, his
colleagues, his friends. I have experienced this rooting at a very personal
level. When I have brought Greg a problem I’m struggling with in class, or
a manuscript I’m working on, he has immediately taken on my problem as
his problem. It isn’t that he appropriates my work; there is virtually no ego
anywhere in sight. It is a kind of intellectual and emotional empathy.
Where previously I was alone worrying about the miscommunication I was
10. Gordon G. Young, The Significance of Border Crossings: Lopez, Morrison and the Fate
of Congressional Power to Regulate Goods, and Transactions Connected with Them, Based on
Prior Passage Through Interstate Commerce, 61 MD. L. REV. 177 (2002).
11. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
12. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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experiencing in class, or the argument I was having trouble constructing, or
the student I was concerned about, now I have the full collaboration of
someone whose only goal is to make sure that I succeed, that I make good
choices.
I, too, have been the beneficiary of Greg’s intellectual empathy, as I
suspect many others in this room have as well. A decade ago, I volunteered
(perhaps a bit rashly) to teach Constitutional Law I—a course that I had not
previously taught, but that I had always hoped to tackle. I saw that Greg
was teaching the same course the semester before me, and I asked if I could
sit in on his class, thinking that it would be a good way to familiarize
myself with the material. Greg, of course, said yes. And sitting in on his
class did allow me to familiarize myself with the relevant material. But it
provided me with so much more than that. First, I got to see a master
teacher at work—a teacher who had high expectations of his students and
even higher expectations of himself. Greg viewed it as his responsibility
not only to make sure that he taught well, but that his students learned
well—and believe me, they did. Beyond that, however, Greg took on the
project of helping me prepare to teach constitutional law as part of his own
teaching package. The night before most classes, he would send me his
teaching notes annotated with explanations of why he had decided to
structure the class in a particular way. And, after most class sessions, we
would debrief over a cup of coffee and Greg would talk about what he
thought had gone well and what he thought he could have done differently.
From there, we would often segue way into a substantive discussion of the
day’s cases and how they fit together—or failed to. In the process, I gained
not only a deep understanding of a complex body of material but also a
treasure trove of ideas about how to teach that material effectively. And
although my students the next semester did not know it, they actually got
the benefit of two constitutional law teachers—one, a novice who was just
dipping her toe into the subject, and the other, a wise and generous
colleague, who had shared his considerable expertise.
There are other ways as well, in which Greg humanizes our
community. While many of us are occupied with assessing the intellectual
firepower of an appointments candidate, Greg, who surely knows more
about intellectual firepower than most, inevitably asks, “So, do you think he
is a truly good person?” While many of us conduct business or do work in
our offices, Greg does life in his. In this respect, he is indeed very much
like Charlie Black. As a student, I remember walking past Professor
Black’s office, to be drawn in by a kindly voice offering me a photocopy of
his latest poem or the opportunity to listen for a moment to an old record by
Louis Armstrong. Greg’s office works a similar gravitational pull on me.
Maybe it is a story about the young person he has befriended in his kick-
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boxing class, perhaps a crackling recording of Wallace Stevens reading a
poem. Inevitably, I dip my head in, I stay for a while, and when I leave, I
leave more centered, more focused—a happier, healthier person.
Greg’s humanity and concern for his colleagues extends well beyond
the walls of the Law School. Many years ago, Greg and his wife Ruth, and
I, and my husband Vince, shared a set of season tickets to the Maryland
men’s basketball team at College Park. (This was back in the day when
Maryland was a basketball powerhouse.) Sometimes, the four of us went to
a game together, but more often, Greg and my husband took one or more of
our sons, since I wasn’t nearly as much of a basketball fan as they all were.
When my husband died suddenly in 2002, I thought about dropping our
share of the season tickets, but Greg gently suggested that I keep it. And
then—quietly and without fanfare—Greg began taking my boys to the
basketball games—something that they looked forward to and enjoyed
immensely—and not just for the basketball. Somehow, I think Greg sensed
(before I did) just how important it would be for them to continue to do
something that they had enjoyed doing with their dad and to do it with a
man who cared about them and who shared their passion. My older son
now makes his living as a sports writer and I think of Greg almost every
time I see my son’s byline on a basketball story.
I want to conclude with a story. Greg knows that my older daughter,
who is a high school senior due to start college in the fall, has a passion for
history. A few months ago, casually, he lent me the first DVD of a fivedisc series written and presented by Simon Schama on the history of
Britain, 13 and suggested that my daughter and I might enjoy watching it
together. Schama is University Professor in Art History and History at
Columbia, and is a thoroughly stylish and engaging guy, and the video is
both fascinating and beautiful to watch. My daughter and I watched the
first disc, nearly three hours worth, and were totally taken in. Then Greg,
like a pusher, gave us the remaining discs in the series and told us to take
our time working through them. We have been enjoying them periodically,
in between visits to colleges, getting ready for the senior prom, and all the
other things that families do when a child is about to graduate from high
school.
Now the reason I share this story is not just because it shows that Greg
is a generous and thoughtful guy who, having enjoyed these videos, wanted
to make sure that his friends did as well. It is that, I believe consciously,
Greg understood that he was giving me and my daughter a special reason to
spend time together doing something that we will remember warmly next
year when she is away at college. In his way, Greg, having gone through

13. A HISTORY OF BRITAIN (BBC Home Entertainment 2010).
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the challenge of sending a kid off to college, knew how to help us get ready
for this transition, and knew how to do so without even mentioning it. His
is a gentle hand, a kind hand, and a knowing one. He has contributed to our
community in so many ways that remain unseen and yet we all benefit from
his special sort of genius. Thank you, Greg, for all that you have done and
all that you do.

GREG YOUNG AND COMMUNITY
LEE KOVARSKY ∗
When we talk about Greg Young and his legacy in the legal academy,
we inevitably drift to conversations about communities. Specifically, Greg
cultivated, treasured, and contributed to two communities organized around
very different things: communities built around ideas, and communities
built around friendships. For Greg, the reason that the Law School was so
special was because these two communities coexisted in the same physical
space.
In his academic community, Greg is the world’s foremost expert on
United States v. Klein, 14 a post-bellum, enigma-coated decision about the
power of Congress to manipulate the jurisdiction of Article III courts. No
discussion about Greg’s legacy is complete without a fairly extensive word
about Klein. Klein is a favored inkblot of federal courts junkies—the “cult
of Klein” is actually a thing. Until Boumediene v. Bush, 15 one can fairly
argue that Klein sat on a somewhat lonely perch in the federal courts canon
as the only post-Marbury Supreme Court case using Article III to strike
down a statutory limit on the jurisdiction of federal courts. Klein is a truly
delphic opinion, and I suspect that its studied ambiguity is what captivates
Greg, a person whose prodigious investment in literary works with that
same quality is known to anyone that has talked to him about a book, poem,
a play, or lyrics to a favorite song.
Klein involved an act of Congress responding to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of a prior statute hemming in the President’s Pardon Power.
Klein’s estate won in the Court of Claims on the ground that Klein’s
Presidential Pardon showed his loyalty and that he was therefore entitled to
the proceeds from the sale of confiscated property. While Klein was
pending on appeal, Congress passed a statute that required the Supreme
Court to dismiss any appeal in which the Court of Claims had determined
∗
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that a Presidential Pardon proved loyalty. The statute also required the
Supreme Court to instruct the Court of Claims, upon remand, to dismiss the
complaint against the United States. Finally, the statute required federal
courts (in most cases) to treat a Presidential Pardon as conclusive proof of
disloyalty that, in turn, barred recovery of proceeds. Congress was seeking
to get around the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of the Pardon Power
by way of jurisdictional specification and evidentiary presumptions.
Klein is about Congress as puppeteer. Congress had withheld some
Article III jurisdiction to decide cases in ways it didn’t like, attempting to
get around constitutional limits on its power to enact substantive rules of
decision about pardons. Greg’s work is central to understanding Klein not
just as a case about limits on Congressional authority to manipulate the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but as a case about limits on
Congressional authority to manipulate the judicial power common to all
courts minted under Article III. In fact, one might fairly characterize a
substantial body of Greg’s work as his Klein project writ large—a
reckoning with the serious threats to constitutional values that jurisdiction
stripping presents, and an attack on the orthodox view that our founding
charter places almost no limits on Congressional authority to manipulate the
jurisdiction of lower federal courts. If Henry Hart is the Klein Cult’s
godfather, then Greg Young has been its faithful caretaker for over thirty
years.
In my personal community, Greg has been my friend only since 2011.
In my academic community, Professor Gordon Young has been a luminary
for much longer. In 2014, I inherited Greg’s Federal Courts class, a
curricular succession after which I will try to reproduce the gifts that Greg
has been giving our students for decades. And Greg has gifted the rest of us
the optimism that our scholarly communities and friendships can share a
roof. Greg, after all, always went to work here with his very best friend: his
wife Ruth.
Greg gives me advice not entirely unlike the way a favorite uncle
imparts wisdom to an impetuous nephew. He shares his more evolved
views on art, wine, books, poetry, and, of course, on federal courts. Greg’s
more of an epicure than I am, but we are still among the only people in the
world that simultaneously love Elvis Costello, the Roots, and United States
v. Klein. Everyone here is part of Greg’s family, one way or another, and
the relationship that Greg shares with those of us writing in tribute reminds
me of a James Baldwin quote: “Children have never been very good at
listening to their elders, but they have never failed to imitate them.”
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A TRIBUTE TO GREG YOUNG
LESLIE MELTZER HENRY ∗
When Lee Kovarsky told me he was concluding his tribute to Greg
Young with the James Baldwin quote about how children never fail to
imitate their elders,16 I remarked that no matter how hard we try, there are
some wonderful things about Greg that we may never successfully imitate:
The way, for example, Greg seamlessly incorporates Wallace Stevens’
poetry into his scholarly work about United States v. Klein; the way that
Greg closes his eyes when you describe your work to him, so that he can
see its contours and possibilities in his mind; or the way that Greg walks the
hallway on the fourth floor before each class, quietly contemplating the
details of ordinary legal cases with the same careful scrutiny he gives
extraordinary art. These qualities are uniquely Greg’s, someone who I have
come to think of as simultaneously embodying—to use the language of the
artistic world he loves—the best qualities of an artistic director, a
playwright, and a cast member.
As most of Greg’s colleagues know, he does not simply teach a class,
like Constitutional Law. Rather, he conceives, develops, and produces it
with the passion and commitment of an artistic director. Like all good
directors, he is keenly aware of what his audience wants (usually more of
the First Amendment), but also committed to giving his audience what he
believes they need (at least a word about the Privileges or Immunities
Clause). He knows how important uncertainty, suspense, and resolution are
to any good story, and so he frequently encourages his students to wander
and ruminate through the puzzles he creates, collecting fleeting impressions
that gradually, and sometimes only days later, snap together to reveal a
pattern of legal significance. I’ve always thought that the brilliance of
Greg’s artistic direction—it really is more than teaching—is this subtleness,
which invites his audience to continue contemplating the meaning of what
they have experienced long after it ends.
In addition to being a talented director, Greg is also a gifted
playwright, both as an academic and a dramatist. Much like the Ancient
Greeks, who were the earliest known playwrights, Greg the scholar has
been inspired to write about Delphic topics. Lee Kovarsky has written
about Greg’s remarkable work on United States v. Klein in this regard, 17 but
to that, let me add that one of the things that makes Greg’s writing inspiring
is his willingness to embrace complexity and ambiguity, even when making
∗
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sense of it requires writing more than one act, as the evolution of Greg’s
work on Klein over the years demonstrates. 18 Greg never worried, as is so
common these days, about how often or where he published. In fact, he
once told me that at its worst, current pressures to publish reminded him of
a different sort of King Midas, counting his articles. Does his daughter
become Issue 3, pages x to y?
The full scope of Greg’s written work, of course, cannot be
highlighted without mention of the fiction, poetry, and plays that he has, to
use his words, “dabbled” with over the years. These pieces—into which I
have only had the slightest glimpse—are the best of Greg. They are a
meeting place for philosophical, literary, and legal ideas to cross-pollinate.
I feel so privileged to have read this work, and it is my sincere hope that he
continues it, and when ready, shares it more publicly.
Although Greg is a superb artistic director and a skilled playwright, I
suspect most of his colleagues know him best as a modest cast member, a
central part of our community who does not seek credit for much of what he
does. I am fairly certain that Greg’s modesty is the reason that he has the
shortest faculty biography on the law school’s website, and yet, to so many
of us, he has played a leading role in making this an academic community
of which we are proud to be a part. Regardless of whether we successfully
emulate all that is best of Greg, I can assure you we will try. And as we do,
Greg, we will anxiously await your next act.

18. See Gordon G. Young, United States v. Klein, Then and Now, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J., 265
(2012); Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and
Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189.

